The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy by Bruce G. Blair & Chen Yali
51China Security  Autumn  2006
In their disturbing analysis of  the growing strength of  U.S. nuclear forces, 
professors Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press predict a deterioration of  the 
global security environment in spite of  this seemingly positive trend.1 By their 
calculations, the American nuclear juggernaut now confers absolute nuclear 
superiority over Russia and China as well as lesser nuclear powers. The imbal-
ance, they contend, has become so lop-sided that the United States today 
could mount a surprise nuclear attack that would completely destroy Russian 
or Chinese nuclear retaliatory forces – a first-strike capacity that dramatically 
overturns a long history of  nuclear stalemate. But in an ironic twist of  fate, the 
weakness of  America’s adversaries only undermines U.S. and global security. 
The reason is that American nuclear supremacy removes the root source of  
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stability from the nuclear equation: mutual vulnerability.  The cornerstone of  
stable deterrence and political caution during the Cold War – mutual assured 
destruction (MAD), has crumbled. The professors anticipate a consequent 
fraying of  great power relations, and an 
increase in the likelihood of  nuclear war.  
Primacy is a double-edged sword that 
may confer advantage and court disaster at 
the same time.  In some circumstances the 
United States may use it to advantage, gain-
ing coercive leverage over its adversaries in 
a confrontation (how much, if  any, leverage 
is conferred by nuclear supremacy is a key 
open question in the professors’ minds).  In 
others, the coercive impulse may backfire; the risks may outweigh the benefits 
if  American pressure triggers reactive nuclear alerting and escalation in a crisis 
– increasing the danger of  accidental, unauthorized, or hastily ordered nuclear 
attacks. Overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority, whether intentionally exploited 
or not, will also exert pressure on America’s nuclear rivals to invest heavily in 
modernizing their forces in order to reduce their vulnerability and restore a 
semblance of  nuclear balance.  U.S. superiority and its efforts to preserve it in 
the face of  countervailing Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization thus 
threaten to ignite a nuclear arms race, one that could last for a very long time 
in light of  the wide and widening American lead.  Given the decrepit state of  
the Russian strategic forces and the small size and acute vulnerability of  the 
Chinese strategic arsenal, and the plethora of  ongoing U.S. improvements to 
its arsenal, the professors estimate that a decisive U.S. advantage could endure 
for a decade or more.  The strategic capabilities ‘gap’ is too wide to be closed 
anytime soon.
The professors’ thesis approaches the height of  controversy when it sug-
gests that the United States has deliberately sought the capability to disarm 
its nuclear rivals and has long designed its strategic arsenal for a nuclear first-
strike against Russia and China. Citing the steady improvement in U.S. strate-
gic weapons over decades of  modernization – particularly the striking gains 
in missile accuracy and stealth bomber technology, combined with intensive 
efforts to track Soviet strategic submarines, the professors conclude that the 
United States has long been deliberately pursuing a first-strike strategy.
Their thesis suggests 
that nuclear primacy 
will embolden the U.S.  
to press its nuclear 
advantage in un-
thinkable  ways.
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Their thesis reaches the zenith of  its provocation when it suggests that 
nuclear primacy will embolden the United States to press its nuclear advan-
tage in possibly unthinkable ways.  U.S. leaders might try to exploit its nuclear 
superiority not only by trying to extract concessions during a crisis, but also by 
actually launching a cold-blooded nuclear attack against its nuclear rival in the 
midst of  an intense crisis.  The professors discount significantly the power of  
the nuclear taboo to restrain U.S. leaders from crossing the fateful threshold. 
If  crisis circumstances grow dire enough, the temptation to try to disarm their 
nuclear adversaries through a nuclear first-strike may be too strong to resist, 
they argue.
In projecting a turbulent decade ahead in relations among the major 
nuclear rivals, the professors anticipate specifically that nuclear dynamics will 
grow more dangerous as weak adversaries take desperate steps to reverse their 
growing vulnerability and as the strong power weighs newfound opportunities 
to exploit its advantage. The weak may be driven to preemption for survival, 
and the strong tempted to initiate a preventive nuclear strike.  The professors 
predict escalatory updrafts in both peacetime and crisis interactions that are 
at best partially moderated by the nuclear taboo, the end of  the Cold War, and 
risk aversion. All sides may be willing to take cosmic risks. The United States, 
now endowed with ostensible first-strike capacity, will not be automatically 
dissuaded from nuclear aggression by recognizing that there would be no 
guarantee of  complete success in disarming the opposing side. The professors 
find no supporting historical evidence, and ample disconfirming evidence, for 
the oft-claimed dampening effect of  so-called existential deterrence – the no-
tion that the mere possibility, or even just the conceivability, of  retaliation by 
an inferior opponent would serve to deter the superior side. The irreducible 
risk that a first strike might fail in unexpected ways and result in retaliation 
that inflicts severe damage to the United States is not, in the professors’ view, 
sufficient cause by itself  to inhibit U.S. leaders from rolling the dice.
Pentagon’s Rebuttal
The professors’ arguments elicited an avalanche of  criticism from wide-
ranging quarters including the Pentagon.2 The assistant defense secretary for 
international security policy took particular aim at the contention that the 
United States is pursuing a first-strike strategy.3 Calling this contention “an 
erroneous inference,” the official cited recent trends toward major strategic 
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forces reductions as inconsistent with such a strategy. He asserted, moreover, 
that presidential statements and authoritative posture reviews endorse the 
traditional policy of  second-strike deterrence. Noting a longstanding policy 
of  not relying on the ability to conduct a nuclear first strike to ensure the 
survival of  the United States, this official claims that the U.S. force posture is 
designed only to ensure that U.S. forces could retaliate to an enemy attack with 
such devastating force that any aggressor could not stand to gain.  In short, 
the Pentagon invoked the classic formulation of  deterrence based on massive 
retaliation as the bedrock of  past and present American nuclear policy.
In a similar vein, another fierce critic of  the professors’ first-strike thesis 
labeled it “a gross mischaracterization of  U.S. policy.”4 This critic – a defense 
intellectual and former senior defense official in the Bush administration, and 
a defense contractor, tried to debunk the first-strike claim largely by citing for-
merly secret documents and authoritative public statements that indicate the 
United States has long relinquished any aspiration of  first-strike supremacy. 
Far from harboring such ambition today, the architects of  U.S. nuclear policy 
abandoned the notion of  winning a nuclear war and adopted the principle 
of  mutual deterrence by the early- to mid-1960s, and proceeded to design a 
retaliatory strategic posture accordingly.  The reduced size and much of  the 
reconfiguration of  the U.S. strategic arsenal over the past decade – particularly 
the retirement of  the silo-busting Peacekeeper missiles – as well as the virtual 
absence of  active and passive defenses for protecting the United States from 
enemy nuclear attacks, point to a conscious U.S. rejection of  a first-strike 
war-winning strategy.
Professors’ Rejoinder
The professors’ rejoinder to these critics emphasizes the increasing lethal-
ity of  U.S. strategic forces despite their reduced numbers.5 Upgrades to the 
U.S. arsenal have resulted in a stunning increase in its counterforce deadliness 
beyond anything necessary to maintain simple deterrence, suggesting to the 
professors a strong U.S. desire for nuclear primacy and an intentional effort 
to achieve it throughout the Cold War period and to this day. Only nuclear 
primacy would justify the extensive upgrades to the U.S. capability for attack-
ing and destroying Russia’s arsenal, they believe.  Furthermore, recently de-
classified documents provide what constitutes, in the professors’ judgment, 
overwhelming evidence of  preemptive war planning as late as 1969, including 
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a number of  explicitly preemptive options that war planners even contem-
plated might be exercised in a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack against the 
Soviet Union. They believe that further declassification of  documents will 
reveal a continuation of  this preemptive thinking by Pentagon strategists in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and even later as it appears to them that the United 
States has never abandoned plans for preemptive nuclear war.
First-Strike Intentions
Both the professors and their critics failed to adduce some key points that 
would have illuminated the question of  America’s first-strike intentions and 
plans. One key to resolving their disagreement over true intentions concerns 
the high level of  destruction that U.S. strategic forces were required to inflict 
on Soviet targets in wartime.  Throughout the Cold War and later, the Pentagon 
architects of  U.S. nuclear strategy instructed U.S. strategic commanders to 
ensure that U.S. forces could destroy no less than 70 to 90 percent of  the 
Soviet targets in each of  four categories – nuclear forces, conventional forces, 
war-supporting industry, and leadership.6 The normal peacetime and crisis 
alert postures of  the U.S. arsenal were thus configured to permit the rapid 
destruction of  a quite large portion of  the Soviet arsenal. U.S. nuclear plan-
ning strove to meet an average of  80 percent so-called ‘damage expectancy’, 
sometimes resulting in the assigning of  dozens of  U.S. nuclear weapons to 
strike the same target to ensure its destruction.  For example, as recently as 
1991 the U.S. strategic war plan aimed 69 nuclear warheads at the Pushkino 
battle management radar north of  Moscow, which controlled the anti-ballistic 
missile interceptors protecting the city as well as the radar itself, in order 
to meet the high ‘damage expectancy’ requirement against this single target 
that U.S. planners credited with high blast resistance and active, effective self-
defense using its own interceptors. 7
Holding at risk such a high fraction of  the Soviet target base is quite ag-
gressive and from a certain angle could appear to approach the 100 percent 
destruction that a committed first-strike policy would seek. And if  Soviet (or 
Russian) forces that normally enjoyed a high degree of  invulnerability because 
of  their dispersion and mobility fell into disrepair and became confined to 
their home bases and ports where they became vulnerable to sudden attack, 
then the United States could approach 100 percent ‘damage expectancy’ ef-
fortlessly. A lack of  Russian diligence in operational terms could by default 
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boost U.S. attack capabilities into the first-strike league.  But this was not 
the original intent of  the U.S. planners.  Regarding a first-strike capability 
as beyond realistic aspiration, they generally set their sights lower than 100 
percent.  And generally the level of  damage expectancy that U.S. forces could 
realistically achieve was well below 100 percent, leaving Russia with at least 
a small survivable force capable of  inflicting unacceptable damage to the 
United States.  Whether or not the current Russian force poses such a minimal 
deterrent threat to the United States, or is acutely vulnerable to a disarming 
U.S. first strike today,  the historical record 
strongly indicates that the United States 
has not consciously pursued a first-strike 
strategy as an act of  deliberate national 
policy.
Future history is of  course still being 
written, and we may yet witness the United 
States embarking on a new path with ab-
solute nuclear superiority over Russia (and 
China) as its goal.  But few signs indicate an American quest for nuclear pri-
macy vis-à-vis Russia or China.   By contrast, there are ample indications that 
the United States seeks nuclear superiority over many other states and actors, 
including Iran, North Korea, and other potential proliferant states and non-
state actors including terrorist organizations.  Establishing and maintaining a 
nuclear first strike capability against these states and groups may reasonably 
be construed to be an aim of  current U.S. national security policy.
Preemption versus First-Strike
Both the professors and their critics also muddy the waters by often con-
flating preemption and first strike.  Thus the debate at times revolves around 
whether or when the United States added or removed preemptive options 
to or from its nuclear war plan, as though their presence would prove the 
existence of  a first-strike strategy.   The professors are right about the fact 
that the U.S. war plan featured these options well past the 1960s.  Designated 
preemptive options existed long after that (through at least the late 1980s), 
and at any rate the immediate launch readiness of  modern strategic missiles 
created an inherent capability to strike quickly and first.  But while delivering 
the first blow is essential to any strategy that seeks to completely decimate 
The historical record 
strongly indicates that the 
U.S. has not consciously 
pursued a first-strike 
strategy.
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an adversary’s nuclear arsenal, it may also be essential to go first in order to 
destroy only a fraction of  that arsenal.  As it turns out, U.S. strategic forces 
for practically the entire Cold War period could not meet their damage expec-
tancy requirements if  they absorbed a Soviet attack before retaliation.  The 
U.S. nuclear war machine could not afford to ride out an attack if  it sought 
to achieve its war aim of  destroying a major fraction – but by no means all 
– of  the Soviet nuclear arsenal. To wipe out 70-90 percent of  the Soviet target 
base, additional U.S. forces needed to be put on combat alert, and virtually all 
of  the alert forces had to be unleashed before Soviet forces could hit them.8  
Under these pressures, the United States either must have initiated the war 
with a preemptive attack, or launched its strategic forces quickly on tacti-
cal warning of  a Soviet missile salvo (‘launch-on-warning’) before incoming 
Soviet warheads could strike U.S. missile silos and bomber bases.  If  it waited 
too long and suffered losses on the ground, the U.S. retaliatory forces could 
not perform their assigned mission.  If  U.S. leaders waited too long to order 
the launch of  U.S. forces, and the Soviets concentrated their nuclear firepower 
on the U.S. command system, then the United States might not have been 
able to retaliate at all.  Preemption, or launch-on-warning, provided the only 
reliable wartime options for partially disarming the Soviet Union.
Launch on Warning Negates First-Strike Strategy
As both sides acquired in the 1970s and 1980s credible options to launch 
on warning (firing forces almost immediately upon receiving reports of  enemy 
missile launches from ground- and space-based warning sensors), the utility of  
a first strike declined greatly.  Initiating a sudden strike using intercontinental 
rockets capable of  destroying hard targets such as missile silos could not catch 
opposing forces on the ground.  The opposing side could detect an incoming 
salvo of  enemy warheads and launch its hair-trigger retaliatory forces during 
the 25-30 minute flight time of  the incoming warheads.  Submarine rockets 
positioned off  the coasts of  enemy territory could reach their targets much 
faster but they lacked the accuracy and yield needed to destroy hardened 
targets.  (Their flight time from forward locations is 15 minutes or somewhat 
less, which is nearly the same as the launch-on-warning timeline.)
These hair-trigger postures on both sides greatly diminished if  not negated 
the utility of  first-strike options in the U.S. and Soviet war plans.   The options 
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underwent a sharp devaluation, just as retaliation after ride-out had much 
earlier been deemed an unreliable option due to vulnerabilities of  missile silos 
and command systems. Both sides’ plans gravitated to the middle ground 
between going first and retaliating after ride-out.  Launch on warning became 
the predominant and preferred option in their strategic war plans.
LOW Dangers and Impracticalities
This shift created enormous pressure on the decision process. Allowing 
only minutes to detect and assess an apparent attack, only minutes to consider 
how to respond, and only minutes to carry out a retaliatory option, launch on 
warning all but eliminated the opportunity for deliberate rational decision-
making and leadership.9  It reduced cosmic choices to rote decision-making by 
checklists in what amounted to enacting a prepared script.  And it introduced 
frightful risks that human error and technical malfunction would cause an 
accidental nuclear war.
Launch on warning quickly lost its viability in the Russian nuclear posture, 
however.10 The United States began in 1992 deploying accurate high-yield 
submarine missiles capable of  destroying hardened targets, and thereby se-
verely degraded Russia’s ability to launch its strategic missiles before they were 
destroyed on the ground. Russian forces within range of  Trident D-5 missiles 
in the Atlantic and Pacific could no longer beat the clock to launch in time 
for them to survive. All targets in Russia could be struck by deadly submarine 
rockets with pinpoint accuracy in less time than it took for Russia to launch 
on warning, even if  the Russian early warning network performed well and 
provided reliable timely reports of  incoming Trident warheads.
In addition, as the professors correctly note, the Russian early warning 
system of  satellite infra-red and ground radar sensors has deteriorated sharply 
over the past decade.11 As a result, there are some gaping holes in Russian 
coverage of  Trident submarine missile corridors, particularly in the Pacific 
region. This decline further eroded any Russian margin for reliable launch 
on warning, but as noted above that margin previously evaporated with the 
advent of  Trident silo-busting missiles with flight times that are shorter than 
Russian nuclear decision cycles. This double-whammy – unreliable Russian 
warning and Trident missiles outracing Russian speed of  response – all but 
ruled out launch on warning by Russia as a practical matter, even though it 
remains the cornerstone of  Russian strategy to this day.
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The professors’ assumption in their model that Russia would be forced 
to absorb the brunt of  a U.S. preemptive or preventive strike before it could 
retaliate is thus a reasonable one. It withstands the scrutiny and criticism of  a 
leading Russian scholar based at Stanford who challenges the professors’ char-
acterization of  Russian early warning on the grounds that “…Russia would 
gain very little were its early warning system to be deployed to the fullest 
extent. Adding the capability to detect SLBM launches would not dramatically 
increase the time available to the Russian leadership for assessing attacks.”12 
We would agree with these statements in that a full-scale U.S. first strike would 
doubtless entail so many launches by so many different delivery vehicles from 
so many directions that in all likelihood the Russian early warning system 
would sound the alarm early and loudly despite its hobbled condition.  And 
Russia would gain little in any case inasmuch as its forces still could not launch 
in time to escape destruction on the ground. The Russian critic is right, but it 
does not invalidate the professors’ assumption of  Russia’s inability to launch 
on warning.
Existential LOW
It would be foolhardy for U.S. leaders to adopt the professors’ assumption, 
however. On the contrary, conservative planners would assume that Russia 
could exercise launch on warning during an opening salvo before its early 
warning system sustained massive damage from nuclear strikes on Russian 
territory. Russia has built and extensively exercised a hair-trigger command 
and early warning system that is thoroughly geared to launch on warning. It is 
an ingenious apparatus that allows for the direct launching of  far-flung nuclear 
missiles by the Moscow-based General Staff  and various alternate command 
centers through a streamlined redundant communications network.13 And al-
though the competing timelines pitting U.S. missiles and Russian quick-launch 
in a race against time slightly favor the United States, the margin is too slim 
for comfort.  The time difference is measured in seconds to at most a few 
minutes.  No conservative planner on either side could confidently predict 
which side would cross the finish line first.  In this vein, it should be em-
phasized that the difference in launch timing among preemption, launch on 
warning, and retaliation after ride-out is also measured in minutes, not hours. 
All of  about 30 minutes bracket the temporal differences among these three 
timing options.
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Residual Instabilities
The professors’ assessment of  the potential instability of  these nuclear dy-
namics is mostly convincing.  Certainly for the canonical case of  U.S.-Russian 
nuclear tension and confrontation, their projection conforms to classical 
theory of  arms race and crisis instability. (The China case does not conform 
for reasons discussed later.)  If  their model’s results showing the United States 
destroying all of  Russia’s and China’s long-range nuclear forces in a first strike 
are valid, then in theory the acute vulnerability of  these forces would indeed 
trigger destabilizing steps to reduce it by means of  readying and dispersing 
sea- and land-based mobile forces. Theoretically, intense pressures and incen-
tives would exist for Russia and China to ratchet up the alert readiness of  their 
forces, and even to consider seriously a preemptive attack during a severely 
threatening crisis. Russia’s preemptive impulse presumably has strengthened 
since U.S. Trident boats stripped Russia of  its option for launch on warning.
Similarly, a crisis in theory could trigger a U.S. preventive attack if  it truly 
believed that Russia had lost its ability to launch on warning, and that no 
Russian strategic forces would survive a U.S. first strike.  U.S. leaders’ preemp-
tive impulse would theoretically grow stronger if  Russia appeared on the verge 
of  dispersing its mobile forces to ensure their survival, a process that would 
ruin America’s chance to disarm Russia. (A massive barrage attack by U.S. 
nuclear warheads against the operating area of  dispersed mobile forces would 
not be practical or effective.)   In addition to 
this dangerous dynamic, safeguards against 
accidental and unauthorized launches 
would weaken as the two sides prepared for 
nuclear war.  Even greater instability and 
risks would theoretically exist in U.S.-China 
crisis interactions.
Although the professors are properly 
concerned with the turbulence associated 
with nuclear crises under the postulated 
conditions of  acute Russian and Chinese 
vulnerability, they characterize all of  the 
steps taken during a crisis as destabilizing.  This characterization is wrong.   For 
instance, if  Russia dispersed its mobile forces to protect them, and managed 
to do so without triggering U.S. preemption, the crisis would be somewhat 
Timelines pitting U.S. 
missiles and Russian 
quick-launch in a race 
against time slightly 
favor the former, but the 
margin is too slim for 
comfort.
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stabilized because Russia would have generated a survivable minimal nuclear 
deterrent.  Admittedly, this transition would be dangerous, but it could lead 
to a more stable balance than the initial one.   The professors mistakenly, or 
better myopically, view all crisis interactions as destabilizing, even those that 
restore mutual vulnerability.
Exploiting Primacy
The underlying crisis scenarios for their model are too vaguely outlined to 
grasp these transitions and their bad and good effects on stability.  While the 
professors raise many questions about the implications of  nuclear primacy 
for coercive diplomacy and escalation dominance during a crisis, the calcula-
tions invoked as evidence of  nuclear primacy are based on a sudden first 
strike by the United States before Russia would disperse any strategic forces 
in order to protect them.
It simply strains credulity to imagine the United States strong-arming 
Russia during a crisis by dint of  its first-strike threat when Russia could easily 
remove this threat by mobilizing some of  its nuclear forces according to pre-
programmed alert procedures.  Russia historically has planned to do exactly 
that during a crisis.  During the Cold War, it kept only 15-25 percent of  its 
submarine forces at sea under normal peacetime conditions, for instance, 
with a view to surging the remainder of  its submarine fleet to sea during a 
crisis. 14 Today even fewer Russian submarines are on patrol under normal 
circumstances, and only small numbers of  Russian mobile intercontinental 
rockets leave garrison on patrol in peacetime.  But the low operating tempo, 
while partially caused by training and equipment readiness problems, mainly 
reflects the Russian planning premise that an American bolt-out-of-the-blue 
surprise nuclear attack in peacetime is completely implausible, and that serious 
U.S. threats made during a real crisis could be answered by surging subs and 
dispersing land rockets, and by projecting a plausible readiness to preempt or 
launch on warning if  necessary.
The professors argue that these protective steps may be ineffectual in the 
future as a consequence of  U.S. breakthroughs in surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and tracking that could expose the location of  hidden strategic forces and 
render them vulnerable to destruction by U.S. forces.  In fact, the professors 
assume such U.S. capabilities already exist.  But this assumption is a very weak 
reed for their model to lean on.  The Russians certainly have cause for con-
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cern about the technological prowess of  the United States, but U.S. progress 
in making the forests transparent to expose hidden Russian rockets is not that 
impressive, if  the public record is any indication.  And the defense still has 
the advantage over the offense.  Simple protective countermeasures can be 
devised to offset new U.S. capabilities.  At any rate, this is a large topic that is 
beyond the scope of  any analysis that the professors have presented so far.  It 
is also beyond the scope of  this review.
A Shaky Model of  Nuclear War
Concerning the current state of  Russian vulnerability, the professors’ analysis 
contains some flaws that cast their central thesis into serious doubt.  The data 
used in their model are simply not reliable enough to support their sweeping 
generalization about America’s ability to destroy all of  Russia’s strategic forces 
in a nuclear first strike.
Their assessment of  the strategic imbalance rests on fairly solid empirical 
data on the characteristics of  the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, particu-
larly their numbers, explosive yields, and ranges.  But high confidence in their 
estimates of  U.S. missile accuracy is unwarranted.   Such estimates of  missile 
inaccuracy (circular error probable) found in the public domain vary widely 
(by 30 percent or more), and their estimates lie on the optimistic end of  
the spectrum. (The real data are classified and so it is next to impossible to 
validate any model’s estimates.)  Actual accuracy achieved in wartime may also 
diverge from accuracy demonstrated in peacetime missile tests. The profes-
sors assume that accuracy could decline by as much as 20 percent in wartime, 
but what if  their un-degraded peacetime estimate was too optimistic and the 
20 percent wartime degradation came on top of  it, resulting in a cumula-
tive deviation of, say 40-50 percent from their baseline accuracy figure? The 
professors’ sensitivity analysis of  the effects of  degraded accuracy on target 
destruction is thus too circumscribed, and they do not adequately inform the 
reader that the probabilities of  destroying Russian hard targets such as missile 
silos would plummet if  U.S. missiles missed their targets by a considerably 
greater distance than assumed by their model.
Other flawed assumptions further skew their model’s results much too far 
in the direction of  the total annihilation of  Russian forces. The question-
able assumptions primarily concern the alert status of  both U.S. and Russian 
forces.  First, the model assumes that the United States could covertly gener-
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ate its off-alert strategic bomber force to combat-ready alert, and secretly 
undertake other large-scale preparations for a sneak attack.   In the real world 
in peacetime, all bombers and their crews are kept at a low level of  readiness. 
They are unarmed; all nuclear armaments (gravity bombs and cruise missiles) 
are kept in storage at their bombers’ home bases. In this world, the alerting 
and arming of  this force would take a minimum of  12 hours for the first 
bombers to reach combat ready status, with the rest of  the bombers coming 
on line over the next 48 hours (72 hours total to generate the bulk of  the 
force).15 It is a large-scale, ‘noisy’, and readily detectable process.
In the model, however, the majority of  the bombers are uploaded with 
nuclear arms and readied for combat missions so surreptitiously as to remain 
undetected by any adversary. All of  the supporting operations for the bomber 
force, ranging from readying and pre-deploying refueling tankers (most refu-
eling occurs over Canada or the oceans mid-way to the targets) to assembling 
aircrews to activating command-control-communications links, also proceed 
so stealthily as to preserve the element of  surprise.  Submarine alerting and 
positioning for a surprise attack also 
go undetected. In short, very extensive 
nuclear attack preparations across the 
board of  the U.S. strategic system fail to 
alert the adversary of  the possibility of  an 
impending attack.
This complete intelligence failure is not 
plausible.  It is especially far-fetched in any 
context of  U.S.-Russian crisis that would presumably motivate the U.S. nuclear 
alerting in the first place, but would also intensify intelligence gathering by the 
Russians. No sober U.S. political leader or military commander would count 
on achieving such complete surprise in the run-up to launching a full-scale 
strategic attack on a supposedly unsuspecting Russia in the midst of  a crisis. 
No analyst of  the strategic balance should treat such a prospect as anything 
but an excursion into the realm of  remote possibility.
Second, the model overstates the peacetime vulnerability of  Russian mo-
bile missiles. It assumes that all 291 SS-25 intercontinental mobile missiles are 
either confined like sitting ducks to their 40 garrisons where they would be 
readily destroyed wholesale by a small number of  U.S. nuclear warheads, or 
alternatively that nine or so out of  the 291 would be out of  garrison in the 
The sensitivity analysis 
of degraded accuracy on 
target destruction is too 
circumscribed.
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field but visible to U.S. surveillance satellites and thus vulnerable to complete 
obliteration by U.S. nuclear strikes.  The trouble with this assumption is that it 
is not well documented and, in our estimation, is wrong.
Reality Testing
In our own research in this area, knowledgeable experts with access to 
intelligence sources disclosed that at least one and often two regiments of  
SS-25s typically operated in the field at any one time, and sometimes (though 
rarely) three regiments. 16 We would not rule out the possibility that all of  
Russia’s SS-25 missiles are occasionally confined to garrison for a period of  
time, though no public evidence substantiates such occurrences.  If  they did 
happen to be all clustered in garrison on a given day, however, it seems highly 
doubtful in the extreme that the United States would be waiting for just such 
a moment to mount a surprise nuclear attack.  Such opportunism, devoid 
of  any political context, is an artifact of  mathematical modeling of  nuclear 
exchanges, and cannot be taken seriously.
The same point applies to the model’s alternative assumption about mobile 
missiles – that those in the field have been located by U.S. satellites, and thus 
also become sitting ducks.  We agree with the professors and others, including 
Russian military analysts, that these mobile missiles may have detectable sig-
natures that compromise their location, but 
how often, for how long, and for how many 
of  the missiles from the one, two, or three 
regiments in the field are open questions. 17 
Without stronger evidence than the profes-
sors provide, writing off  this key Russian 
force is pre-mature and indefensible.
To a lesser degree, the same criticism 
applies to the model’s dismissive treatment 
of  Russian strategic submarines.  These 
boats completed three patrols in 2005, for an uncertain period of  time in each 
case (the combat patrols lasted 78-days typically during the 1980s). 18 While 
tracking Russian submarines on patrol is presumably much easier today than 
it was during the Cold War, writing them off  as casualties of  U.S. anti-sub-
marine operations undertaken in concert with a first strike is not adequately 
supported by evidence and analysis.
Alerting and arming of 
the U.S. strategic bomber 
force takes a minimum of 
12 hours and is a ‘noisy’, 
and readily detectable 
process.
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The combination of  these flawed or unsubstantiated assumptions – that 
the United States could generate practically its full nuclear armada undetected, 
and then strike opportunistically to destroy swiftly and completely all Russian 
sea- and land-based mobile strategic forces in garrison, in port, at sea, and 
hidden in the field – severely undermines the professors’ projection of  total 
first-strike effectiveness. A completely disarming attack is simply not plau-
sible.   Absent solid corroborating evidence, their calculation of  zero surviving 
Russian retaliatory forces should be adjusted upwards to between a handful 
and tens of  surviving mobile strategic forces.
Together with other questionable assumptions – overly optimistic estimates 
of  U.S. missile accuracy, overly pessimistic assessment of  Russia’s ability to 
launch on warning, a static vulnerable Russian alert posture regardless of  
peacetime or crisis circumstances – their calculations further strain credulity 
and warrant further upward adjustment.  Enough Russian nuclear firepower 
would survive to constitute at least a minimal deterrent force capable of  in-
flicting such grave harm in retaliation that U.S. leaders would surely absolutely 
refrain from initiating an unprovoked preventive attack, and would reasonably 
consider launching a preemptive strike during a severe crisis only if  they came 
to believe that a nuclear attack by Russia was imminent and unavoidable.
Longstanding Achilles Heel
The only first-strike attack scenario that could plausibly neutralize the abil-
ity of  Russia to strike back in retaliation is one that the professors’ model 
consciously omits – the rapid suppression of  the Russian command system. 
Decapitating the command hierarchy and severing communications links in 
order to prevent the issuance and dissemination of  orders to launch Russian 
forces would stand a better chance of  disarming Russia. The result of  an 
optimal U.S. attack on the central nervous system of  Russia’s nuclear arsenal 
could be stark: zero useable Russian retaliatory forces. 19
The professors acknowledge this scenario and correctly emphasize that it 
only reinforces their characterization of  the overpowering strength of  U.S. 
offensive nuclear forces.  However, the fact that Russian (and Soviet) com-
mand vulnerability is a longstanding weakness and potential source of  crisis 
instability points to a glaring and fatal flaw in the professors’ argument:  the 
stunning shift in the strategic nuclear balance actually occurred a long time 
ago.
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Nuclear History Revisionism
The professors’ contention that the era of  mutual assured destruction has 
just ended with the rise of  total U.S. superiority ignores the fact that MAD 
never existed as an operational policy on either the Russian or U.S. side.  (It 
more closely approximates the Chinese stance.)  Readers may remember that 
MAD is a two-sided version of  assured destruction (AD), a cornerstone of  
deterrence logic that required an ability to absorb an opponent’s maximum 
attack and strike back with devastating force in retaliation.  Contrary to the 
Pentagon’s assertion noted earlier that second-strike retaliation best describes 
U.S. nuclear policy, it has actually been a very long time since either Russia or 
the United States possessed any real confidence in their ability to retaliate after 
riding out a massive attack, because of  the vulnerability of  their individual 
forces but mainly because of  the vulnerability of  their command systems.20
Both regarded AD as an infeasible operational concept, and long ago 
geared themselves for launch on warning or preemption.  And hence in this 
crucial respect MAD has long been defunct, and thus the professors’ warning 
that the era of  MAD is ending is divorced from historical reality.
With respect to the acute vulnerability of  individual Russian forces, the 
professors’ argument also misses the historical mark by more than a decade. 
The collapse of  the Russian strategic forces and the gross deterioration of  
its early warning network occurred when the Soviet Union broke apart in 
1991.  That is when Russia drastically curtailed submarine and mobile land 
missile patrols, and when Russian missile 
silos became acutely vulnerable to a first 
strike by U.S. Peacekeeper (MX) missiles 
and soon after by Trident D-5 submarine 
missiles armed with W-88 warheads.21
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces as well 
as it’s nuclear command and early warning 
system has declined somewhat more since 
the bottom fell out in the early 1990s, but 
the decline in recent years has occurred on 
the margins.  Margins do count, but not enough in this case to support the 
professors’ claim.  Consider that over a decade ago the Russian submarine 
force was struggling to keep a single submarine on patrol at any given time. 
Typically a Delta IV in the Atlantic rotated off  and on patrol with a Delta III 
If the Russian strategic 
nuclear forces were 
acutely vulnerable 10-
15 years ago, we can go 
back to a past future to 
test them.
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in the Pacific.  The professors may be correct in their model’s assumption 
that the United States could track and sink a solitary Russian submarine at 
sea today, but if  so the United States could have performed this same feat 
over a decade ago. The public literature offers scant evidence of  any recent 
breakthrough in the science and art of  submarine trailing.  By the same token, 
the Russian SS-25 force was struggling to keep one or two regiments out of  
garrison in the field at any time over a decade ago.  Again, we have found no 
body of  evidence to suggest any breakthrough in the ability of  U.S. satellites 
to locate them in the field.  If  these missiles could be tracked and destroyed 
today, then they were no more survivable 10 years ago either.  A nuclear 
barrage attack designed to saturate their operating areas, furthermore, was 
more feasible 10 years ago than today because of  the larger U.S. arsenal then. 
Similarly, Russia’s silo-based missile force stood no more chance of  surviving 
a U.S. counterforce strike over a decade ago than it does today, and Russia’s 
prospects of  launch on warning were also no better then than now.
History Refutes the Primacy Predictions 
If  the Russian strategic nuclear forces were acutely vulnerable 10-15 years 
ago, then we do not have to wait to test the professors’ dire predictions of  the 
future.  We can go back to a past future to test them.
The professors’ predictions and hypotheses about the adverse implications 
of  nuclear primacy in the future – fraying of  nuclear relations, re-kindling of  
a nuclear arms race, heightened instability during a crisis, and increased risk 
of  nuclear war – lend themselves to testing in the crucible of  history.  What 
actually happened after Russia’s strategic collapse over a decade ago?  Nothing 
remotely reminiscent of  the theoretically predicted upheaval. Contrary to the 
professors’ expectations, deterrence did not unravel; the imbalance did not 
lead to growing nuclear tensions or to a nuclear arms race and did not induce 
Russia or China to take destabilizing steps. The United States did not con-
template a preventive nuclear strike against Russia or China, nor did Russia or 
China become more poised than before to preempt in a crisis with America. 
All sides all but ignored the theoretical first strike capability of  the United 
States during the past 15 years (and much longer in the case of  China).  This 
history is not a perfect crucible for testing all of  the professors’ hypotheses, 
but the preponderance of  evidence so far refutes their argument.
What this recent history really seems to be suggesting is that U.S. nuclear 
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primacy is an academic artifice that was and is practically useless for under-
standing America’s relations with other nuclear powers. Nuclear primacy in 
modern times offers no exploitable political leverage. Russia and China ap-
pear quite confident in their deterrent arsenals in spite of  the lopsided U.S. 
advantage estimated by models of  nuclear war.
China Repudiates the Primacy Concept
 The deficiencies of  standard nuclear calculations of  the sort performed 
by the professors are abundantly evident in the case of  China. The Chinese 
nuclear story cannot be explained in Western theoretical terms, and requires 
a radically different interpretation. Compared to the Russian case, the his-
tory of  nuclear relations between China and the United States shows a much 
starker imbalance favoring the United States (in narrow technical respects 
and in Western theoretical terms) over a much longer period of  time.  And 
yet virtually none of  the destabilizing effects postulated by Western stability 
theory materialized during or after the Cold War.  (Such effects did materialize 
in the case of  Sino-Soviet nuclear relations, which were also marked by a stark 
imbalance favoring Russia.)
On the contrary, as discussed next, China never wavered from its no-first-
use (NFU) doctrine and its belief  that a small arsenal would suffice to prevent 
nuclear blackmail by the superpowers.22
China’s nuclear strategy is composed of  primarily two parts: no-first-use23 
and “houfazhiren”24 or the second-strike operation. The latter is a delayed, 
limited retaliatory nuclear attack to destroy an enemy’s soft targets after China 
absorbs an enemy’s first nuclear attack. This defensive strategy does not aim 
to build an arsenal to dominate, but instead to defend and to deter. China built 
the bomb to preclude nuclear blackmail and coercion.25 This policy places 
no value on achieving nuclear parity with anyone. If  we examine the history, 
the gap between China and the United States in terms of  nuclear force was 
intentionally designed and maintained for four decades. China did not revamp 
its arsenal or NFU policy and the self-defense principle of  its nuclear strategy 
for reasons particular to its historical environment and its own view of  the 
utility of  nuclear weapons. Many have argued that it was China’s deliberate 
choice from the outset to absorb a possible first nuclear strike by its enemies, 
to build a rather small strategic force and not to pursue a launch on warning 
capability.26 China’s nuclear doctrine also was and is still based on strong moral 
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considerations that even more strictly confined the role of  nuclear weapons 
to second-strike deterrence (as opposed to the United States and Russia who 
have both considered using them for a first strike).
The belief  Mao Zedong possessed was that China will not invade other 
countries, and that no other countries could conquer China with or without 
nuclear weapons because of  its vast territorial expanse and challenging ter-
rain.  Mao believed that nuclear weapons would not prevent China’s eventual 
victory in a war fought on Chinese soil. 
The logic of  China’s nuclear doctrine thus regarded the use of  nuclear 
weapons against China as ineffective, and therefore so improbable as to be 
virtually impossible, and therefore insignificant as a source of  strategic advan-
tage. China’s calculus for “unbearable loss” and China’s capacity to absorb a 
first nuclear strike differed completely from that of  the United States 27 “The 
second strike capability” China marshals reassures it that other strategic pow-
ers cannot convert their nuclear superiority into real coercive power.  In the 
view of  Chinese leaders, superiority is not convertible.  At best, any advantage 
gained would be small and virtually inconsequential.
China not only completely discounts the utility of  nuclear primacy, but also 
believes that other nuclear powers share its view in spite of  the lip service 
those powers pay to the importance of  nuclear weapons. China simply does 
not believe others truly believe nuclear 
primacy can serve utilitarian purposes.28
China’s experiences in dealing with U.S. 
nuclear threats have only strengthened 
its conviction that nuclear primacy has 
negligible utility. The United States considered using nuclear weapons against 
China in 1953 during the Korean War, in 1954-1955 during the cross-strait 
crises, and in 1964 before China carried out its first nuclear test. These cases 
in which U.S. leaders clearly thought about using nuclear weapons against 
China but ultimately decided against it reveal a multitude of  reasons for coun-
seling against their use. A nuclear taboo was ascendant at the time.  Allies 
of  the United States would oppose their use.  Attacking China would create 
a vacuum for an even more hostile adversary, the Soviet Union, to occupy. 
Attacking China could not guarantee the destruction of  China’s fledging 
nuclear program, due to sketchy information on the location of  facilities in 
China’s nuclear infrastructure. Without the ability to achieve total victory and 
MAD never existed as an 
operational policy.
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occupy China, the United States could not prevent China from rebuilding any 
destroyed facilities and revitalizing its nuclear program. The United States had 
better choices, especially given China’s flexibility in negotiating and compro-
mising in resolving conflicts with the United States.29
The professors ignore Cold War history in arguing that the nuclear primacy 
the United States allegedly enjoys will drive China toward a rapid build-up of  
its nuclear force that risks precipitating a nuclear arms race and aggravating 
tensions between them. Throughout the Cold War era, even when China was 
threatened repeatedly by both the United States and the Soviet Union with 
nuclear weapons and possibility of  military confrontation, both of  whom held 
absolute nuclear superiority over China, China did not accelerate its nuclear 
program to close the gap. An unflinching China chose to cap its nuclear arsenal 
at a low level instead of  launching a crash program to compete numerically 
with either of  the nuclear superpowers that threatened it. This decision may 
have been partially based on the realization that China lacked the resources 
needed to compete and would lose an arms 
race with its adversaries. But the deeper 
rationale for China’s restraint was its belief  
that primacy lacked any real utility. China 
maintained and still maintains a stark indif-
ference toward nuclear primacy.
China’s real concern about threats to its 
nuclear deterrent capability stems not from nuclear primacy, as the two profes-
sors argue, but from U.S. conventional primacy.  The increasing accuracy and 
lethality of  the American conventional strike capability is tipping the strategic 
balance and eroding China’s deterrent force.30 China’s past assumption that its 
second-strike deterrent against U.S. blackmail can only be eviscerated by a U.S. 
nuclear strike is rapidly crumbling.  A U.S. strike by its conventional precision-
guided cruise missiles and gravity bombs delivered by strategic submarines 
and bombers, and in the future by ICBMs, against China’s small nuclear force 
would circumvent the nuclear taboo. Conventional strikes that destroy China’s 
nuclear deterrent capability are regarded by the Chinese as far more practical 
and less risky for the United States than a nuclear strike would be. And the 
effectiveness of  such conventional strikes could be high. The United States 
is on the verge of  posing a disarming first strike conventional threat against 
all of  China’s strategic nuclear forces.  It is this prospect, and not nuclear 
primacy, that appears to be putting some real pressure on Chinese strategists 
China’s policy places 
no value on achieving 
nuclear parity with 
anyone.
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to revoke China’s longstanding commitment to NFU.
Two additional risks that China’s nuclear force is facing include the pos-
sible perfection of  the U.S. missile defense system and emerging new nuclear 
states in China’s neighborhood.31 Missile defense represents a potential risk 
because, although most experts seriously doubt it will ever succeed technically, 
it circumvents the nuclear taboo in the same way that conventional offensive 
forces do. Therefore U.S. missile defense counts seriously as a strategic fac-
tor in the deterrent equation. As for regional proliferation dangers to China, 
the scenario of  immediate concern is that North Korea’s nuclear test will 
drive Japan to develop a nuclear force, or worse a Japanese nuclear force that 
surpasses China’s planned force.  This would exert domestic political pressure 
on China’s nuclear program and strategy, fueled by nationalistic impulses and 
energized by the “face factor” that Chinese will not allow Japan to get ahead 
in a nuclear build-up. A vigorous nuclear competition between China and 
Japan could occur even while the U.S. and Russian arsenals are shrinking.
These risks are not illuminated by the primacy model, which also neglects 
a key feature of  China’s decision process: a headstrong determination to 
preserve its national unity even if  doing so runs nuclear risks that a rationally 
calculating player would avoid.
Some Chinese scholars have argued that because there is an imbalance of  
interest for Chinese and Americans in Taiwan, the United States would be 
more inclined to back away from a nuclear confrontation.32 China thus might 
believe that the nuclear taboo would restrain the United States more than 
China. Rationally calculating players might apply such logic in their nuclear 
gamesmanship, but there is not only high risk of  miscalculating the other 
side’s degree of  commitment. There is also an element of  sheer craziness or 
stubbornness that defies calculation in the case of  a Sino-American show-
down over Taiwan. The rational primacy framework at least appears to vastly 
overrate America’s coercive leverage over China in such a showdown. 
In all calculations of  nuclear primacy and deterrence, the players are as-
sumed to be rational. However, rational actors might lapse into irrational 
behavior in readily imaginable ways that are completely obtuse to the nuclear 
primacy framework. The obvious scenario in this regard concerns the defeat 
of  China’s military force in a potential Taiwan conflict. The Taiwan issue has 
been a core national interest of  China, one that arouses such fervent emotions 
throughout the country that irrational behavior in its use of  nuclear weapons 
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cannot be ruled out.  
It is a consensus among Chinese military and civilian analysts that China 
needs to modernize its nuclear force to increase its survivability and penetra-
tion capability. There are debates over whether China should pursue a more 
symmetrical build-up of  nuclear force to counter challenges mentioned above 
by increasing the number of  nuclear weapons and  nuclear bases. But the 
NFU commitment remains solid. Very few analysts advocate any revision of  
the doctrine that would make it conditional. After the controversy generated 
by Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu in 2005, who allegedly invoked the specter of  
Chinese first use of  nuclear weapons in the event of  United States intervention 
in a hypothetical Taiwan conflict, a considerable number of  Chinese nuclear 
strategists and senior military officers stepped forward to disavow Zhu’s sce-
nario and reiterate strongly the unconditional nature of  China’s NFU nuclear 
policy. This policy may not be immutable. No doubt future internal debate will 
grapple with the challenges to China’s strategic force and its nuclear doctrine 
posed by missile defense systems and conventional weapons advances. But 
the Zhu incident only renewed and revalidated the old consensus and policy 
against changing China’s nuclear doctrine. NFU will not be dislodged any 
time soon, if  ever.  It is virtually a canon of  Chinese nuclear orthodoxy.
Conclusion
The nuclear primacy thesis and analysis have served as useful reminders 
that obsolete Cold War nuclear dynamics remain in play. The United States 
and Russia in particular still operate their nuclear forces as though they must 
be constantly prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war with each other on 
a moment’s notice. There is no political context to explain this continuing 
deterrent operation, but the two previous nuclear rivals remain trapped in 
their habitual practices from the Cold War era.
The primacy argument, however, does not withstand close scrutiny for 
three major reasons. First, the contention that the era of  mutual assured 
destruction has ended with the emergence of  a unipolar nuclear hegemon 
misses the fact that MAD never existed as an operational policy on either 
side. Second, the claim that a stunning shift in the strategic balance has just 
now occurred misses the fact that the tectonic moment actually occurred 15 
years ago when the Soviet Union collapsed and sapped its nuclear strength in 
the process. Third, Russia’s sudden nuclear decline did not result in the kind 
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The primacy framework 
vastly overrates 
America’s coercive 
leverage over China in a 
showdown over Taiwan.
and intensity of  instability that the professors’ theory predicts should have 
occurred, and therefore the theory is not valid.
The professors’ thesis does not come to grips with the evident truth that 
nuclear security is more a state of  mind than a physical condition, and that 
through their mental prisms Russian and 
Chinese nuclear strategists have come to 
believe that deterring the United States is 
easy to achieve with very small numbers of  
nuclear weapons that have some conceiv-
able prospect of  surviving an attack. And 
Russia and China are not alone. Countries 
like North Korea and Iran also appear to 
share this belief  – that all it takes are a few 
hidden nuclear bombs to offset the U.S. nuclear juggernaut. U.S. strategists 
themselves appear to belong to this school of  thought. The United States is 
easily deterred by any nuclear armed state, even by the most primitive and 
diminutive of  nuclear arsenals. That is why the United States goes to such 
extraordinary lengths to prevent adversaries from acquiring even one solitary 
bomb in the first place. Once acquired, the deterrence game is fundamentally 
altered at the expense of  U.S. military options and political leverage.
In short, the marginal utility of  nuclear weapons is high for low numbers 
and low for high numbers. Similarly, the marginal utility of  gaining the ability 
to project possible retaliation is much higher than the marginal utility of  gain-
ing the upper hand of  a possible disarming first strike.
What U.S. leaders really value and seek today in the military sphere is not 
nuclear but rather conventional primacy. For all the drama and controversy 
surrounding the nuclear rhetoric of  the Bush administration, the bunker 
buster and ‘reliable replacement warhead’ programs, the deeper historical cur-
rent of  U.S. policy is to downgrade nuclear and upgrade conventional roles, 
missions, and capabilities. All of  the branches of  the U.S. military including 
the Strategic Command grasp this trend and have been casting about for new 
conventional missions in lieu of  nuclear – for instance, Strategic Command’s 
bringing information warfare and space under its umbrella.  
The professors’ preoccupation with U.S.-Russian-Chinese nuclear deter-
rence and their use of  an obsolete Cold War formulation of  stability only 
impedes new thinking and answers to today’s real nuclear challenges. Their 
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formulation reinforces the tendency of  current nuclear strategists to over-
state the utility of  U.S. military strength in countering nuclear threats, and to 
understate its counter-productive effects.  U.S. nuclear (or conventional for 
that matter) primacy hardly addresses the asymmetrical warfare conducted 
by weaker states and terrorist organizations, which constitutes a more real 
and lethal threat to Americans.  This threat is less visible and full-bodied than 
the awesome Cold War rivals presented by Russia or China, but it is also less 
impressed by U.S. primacy and thus more problematic.  
The misplaced focus on ‘normal’ deterrable threats in the form of  Russia 
and China fosters a kind of  transference of  faith in military solutions to 
threats that are too slippery to handle with standard military force.  This over-
confidence in and over-reliance on military solutions to emerging prolifera-
tion dangers appears in fact to have created more problems than it has solved. 
Notwithstanding the Pentagon’s criticism of  the professors’ argument, they 
all share a common worldview that revolves around military power despite 
its sharp limitations, and oft-proven dysfunctionality. The resort to nuclear 
force as articulated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and other official 
statements of  U.S. strategy in recent years convey an aggressive message that 
works not to reduce but increase the threat to the United States. 
If  history teaches us anything, nuclear superiority has hardly cleansed the 
world of  America’s enemies.  Opposite approaches based on arms control and 
security reassurances instead of  projection of  military threat have generally 
been far more effective – for instance, U.S. leadership in building a non-pro-
liferation regime that provides security for non-nuclear states has limited the 
number of  countries possessing nuclear weapons. The world is changing and 
in many ways is growing more menacing, but nuclear primacy is an irrelevant 
reference point. Or worse, it is a misguided, even self-destructive one that 
diminishes America’s ability to set the best course for its security. 
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